Articles on the Berlin Airlift 1948-1949

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The Berlin Airlift that began 75 years ago on 26 June 1948 is one of  the most dramatic examples of non-violent resistance to aggression in  modern history. It also represented the first decisive Western victory  in the Cold War and remains to this day the most comprehensive and  successful airlift of all time.  

After the Soviet imposition of a blockade on the Western Sectors of Berlin,  the political leadership in London and Washington refused to consider  either pulling out or fighting. Within days, a de facto airlift had started and this -- more  by default than intent --  became the Allied strategy. Admittedly, not a long-term strategy, but an ad hoc strategy  for weathering the immediate crisis until a diplomatic solution could be  attained that would re-open the surface access routes. 

The problem was that since no one had ever contemplated an airlift on this scale, nobody had the faintest idea of what was needed. 

No one involved at the start of the Airlift ever contemplated or imagined the dimensions that the Airlift would eventually assume. All that they knew was that they needed “a lot” of everything. Or as Clay had put it, all they could haul. RAF instructions were equally vague. The political leadership told the RAF – who it knew perfectly well was under-funded, under-staffed and short of aircraft – “to do their best.” As one of the RAF staff officers charged with organising the operation remarked: “‘something at once’ and ‘do your best’ hardly appeared the most well considered instructions issued at the start of a military operation.”[i]

But one thing was glaringly obvious: the men tasked with carrying out the airlift lacked just about everything.  

When  the British and American Military Governors in Germany decided to try  to keep Berlin alive and free by flying in supplies, neither the USAF  nor the Royal Air Force had any dedicated cargo planes in Germany. For  the RAF the problem was less severe because the RAF's Transport Command  was based less than 500 miles away in the UK. The RAF could and did  rapidly deploy aircraft to "the front", i.e. the Berlin Airlift. The  USAF's assets on the other hand were dispersed around the globe. Yet the  call was made and soon aircraft and aircrew began to pour into Germany  by the hundred. 

Wherever they came from or whatever national or corporate symbol decorated the fuselage of their aircraft, the pilots of the Airlift were thrown into a situation that was unprecedented. They might be first-rate combat or airline pilots, their courage tested, their experience extensive and the number of hours flown impressive, but none of them had ever flown in quite the same circumstances as they now found themselves. No where else in the world did aircraft have to fly in very narrow corridors over distances of a 100 miles or more and in effect have to follow along behind one another like cars on a motorway – maintaining a safe distance and to the extent possible the same speeds.   

The greatest threat to the success of the Berlin Airlift was the weather, and it was the weather that very nearly succeeded in closing the Airlift down. In November 1948, there were so many days of fog that only a fraction of the needed supplies could be flown in, and December wasn’t much better. This came as no surprise to the Allied leadership that had long believed they must “solve” the crisis before winter did it for them. As for the Russians, they counted on the partisanship of “General Winter” who had saved them from Napoleon and Hitler both. The Soviets saw absolutely no reason to negotiate with the West when “General Winter” was going to defeat the Airlift as soon as he arrived. Yet the problems with the weather did not start — or end — in winter. 

 The  Airlift was the first battle in the Cold War and it largely established  the rules of engagement.  Most importantly, both parties avoided direct  military confrontation, preferring proxies and indirect means of  fighting. Thus, although the Soviets could easily have stopped the  Airlift by shooting down Allied aircraft, they instead sought to  interfere using tactics that fell short of outright hostilities.  

 Never before or since have air  forces been called upon to undertake such a massive humanitarian  operation. Yet significantly, the Airlift was not a response to a  natural disaster but rather to hostile provocation. The risk of war was  always present and the duration was indefinite. Morale on the Airlift  was critical to its success and on the whole surprisingly high. 

 Aircraft maintenance is the forgotten step-child of all great aviation achievements. The huge amount of labour, time and dedication that goes into keeping aircraft serviceable so that they can fullfil whatever role is assigned to them is largely forgotten, overlooked or ignored in most accounts of great aviation deeds. The Berlin Airlift is no exception and far too little attention has been paid to the astonishing achievements of ground crews in the most important airlift in aviation history. 

 Arguably, Air Traffic Control was even more important to the success of the Airlift than either flying or maintenance. At a minimum it can be said that given the confined airspace over Berlin and the fact that three airfields in close proximity had to handle continuous streams of incoming traffic, the absence of centralized, precise and professional Air Traffic Control would have doomed many individuals - if not the Airlift itself. Indeed, the innovations made during the Airlift laid the groundwork for all modern Air Traffic Control. 

At the start of the Berlin Airlift there were just two airports in Berlin and three in the Western Zones involved in the effort. At the end there were three airports in Berlin and nine airfields in the Western Zones. Yet this simple fact does not convey the immense efforts and ingenuity involved in creating that infrastructure. The engineers and construction teams that made that infrastructure are unquestionably some of the unsung heroes of the Airlift.  

One aspect of the Airlift was almost entirely in German hands: the on- and off-loading of cargoes. While Allied military personnel supervised loading the trailers and the aircraft and both provided and drove the motor transport, the actual work of loading cargoes was done by civilian work gangs.